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CRISIS, FREE ECONOMY AND STRONG STATE: 
ON ORDOLIBERALISM
Werner Bonefeld1
University of York
Abstract: The ordoliberal conception that the strong but limited state is the fundamental 
precondition of a free society entails a negative judgement about the character of market 
competition. In opposition to the laissez-faire idea of market self-regulation, it rejects as 
dangerous to the constitution of liberty the idea that markets always know best. Competition 
does not unite society. Instead, it manifests freedom in the form of unsocial relationships 
between economic agents and social classes. Ordoliberalism posits the state as planner for 
competition and guardian of enterprise. In this context, the article explores the ordoliberal 
meaning of democracy and liberal interventionism. It concludes by arguing that in the 
ordoliberal view, economic crises manifest a failure of political interventionism. 
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Political Economy is “a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator” 
(Adam Smith).2
The liberal state “has to be as strong as possible within 
its own sphere, but outside its own sphere, 
in the economic sphere, it has to have as little power as possible” 
(Alfred Müller-Armack).3
“The formula ‘strong state’ was meant [by the ordoliberals, WB] 
as a shorthand for a state that is constrained by a political constitution 
that prevents government from becoming the target of special-interest rent seeking” 
(Viktor Vanberg).4
1  I am grateful to Phil Cerny for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper and to the two external 
reviewers for their very close reading of the argument and detailed comments for revision. Magnus Ryner made 
sure of my participation at the plenary discussion about ordoliberalism at the European International Studies 
Association at Warsaw University in September 2014. A special thank you is due to Brigitte Young for her 
immense effort at getting this special issue off the ground.
2  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1981), p. 428.
3  Alfred Müller-Armack, Genealogie der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft (Stuttgart: Paul Haupt, 1981), p. 102. Müller-
Armack is in fact paraphrasing Constant’s critique of democratic government. Benjamin Constant, Political 
Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Translation form German into English by author.
4  Viktor Vanberg, ‘Ordnungspolitik, The Freiburg School and the Reason of Rules’, Diskussionspapiere zur 
Ordnungsökonomie, No. 1 (2014), p. 7.
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INTRODUCTION
The title of the article contains two seeming paradoxes. First, it contends that the 
liberal state is a strong state. This is not a common view. Not only the popular 
literature but also contemporary political philosophy view the neoliberal state as a 
weak state.5 The second paradox derives from the connection between crisis, a strong 
state and a free economy. The contemporary view holds that economic crises herald 
the return of the state as an alternative source of social organisation, replacing the 
market as the predominant force.6 For the ordoliberals, however, the economy has no 
independent existence. Rather, economy is political economy. They thus conceive of 
a free economy as a practice of government. 
The main body of the essay expounds the analytical meaning of the contention 
that a free economy amounts to a political practice of the strong state. The three 
quotations at the start of the essay frame the analytical focus and direction of the 
argument.7 The conclusion explores the consequences of the contention about a free 
economy and a strong state for the understanding of economic crises. 
ON THE POLITICAL FORM OF LIBERTY
The view that neoliberalism calls for a weak state derives from its demand for a 
limited state. This notion is usually taken to mean that the state is literally ‘limited’, 
that is, disempowered and thus weak in relation to the logic of the market.8 Yet, for 
5  See for example, Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). The 
idea of the liberal state as a weak night-watchman state is entirely at odds with neoliberal doctrine, as was 
pointed out already by Gamble in the late 1970s. Andrew Gamble, ‘The Free Economy and the Strong State’, 
Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 1979), pp. 1–25. See also Simon Clarke, ‘The Neoliberal Theory of 
Society’, in Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (eds.) Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London: Pluto, 
2005), pp. 50–59.
6  See, for example, Elmar Altvater, Die Rückkehr des Staates? Nach der Finanzkrise (Hamburg: VSA, 2010). 
The circumstance that the ‘return of the state’ amounted to a politics of financial socialism – one that socialises 
the financial losses and balances the books by political austerity – is attributed to the entrenchment of neoliberal 
ideas in the corridors of power. See, for example, Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
7  Ordoliberal thinking emerged in the context of the – ultimately mortal – crisis of the Weimar Republic. 
It asked what is necessary to rediscover and maintain a free economy at a time of a profound crisis of an 
entire political economy. For accounts that trace its historical context and theoretical trajectory see, Dieter 
Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991); Keith Tribe, 
Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). Ralf Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus zur Sozialen Marktwirschaft (Berlin: Springer, 2013). Werner 
Bonefeld, ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism’, New Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 
5, (2012), pp. 633–656. Anthony Nicholls’ Freedom with Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994) though remarkably uncritical in its interpretation of ordoliberal thought, offers nevertheless an insightful 
account of the emergence of ordoliberalism in the context of the Weimar Republic and its influence in post-war 
West-Germany.
 8  The term ‘neoliberalism’ was coined by Alexander Rüstow in 1938 during discussions at the Colloque Walter 
Lippmann, which was transformed later into the Mont Pelerin Society – the apparent birthplace of neoliberalism. 
In Rüstow’s definition of ‘neo’-liberalism, a free economy amounts to a political practice of government. On 
Rüstow’s elucidation of neoliberalism, see Philip Mirowski and Dieter Phlewe, ‘The Road from Mont Pelerin 
– The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Phlewe eds., The Road 
from Mont Pelerin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 13. See also Benjamin Jackson, ‘At 
the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: The Free Economy and the Strong State, 1930–1947’, The Historical Journal, 
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the ordoliberal argument, only a strong state is able to limit itself, and the strong 
state is therefore a limited state and, conversely, the limited state is the strong state. 
Its task is to enable and facilitate free economy as a rule-based system of non-
coerced market exchanges between competing economic agents each seeking to 
maximise their utility in response to free price movements. For the sake of liberty the 
establishment of a rules-based system of law is an absolute requirement of economic 
order. The invisible hand that is said to coordinate the individual preferences in free 
market economies does not constitute an economic order – in fact, if left to its own 
devices, it is said to destroy the very preconditions upon which its magic of socio-
economic regulation rests. Regulation by means of the invisible hand is premised on 
the existence of a comprehensive liberal order, comprising not only a socio-economic 
order but, also, a moral order that governs the mentality of society in the form of an 
enterprise society. Order is not an economic product. Rather, it is a political practice 
that encompasses both the force of law preserving violence and the rule of law that 
governs an established social order.9 
The strong state is the political form of a free economy. In contrast, the weak 
state is the Achilles-heel of a free economy. It is unable to defend itself from the 
preying social interests and as a consequence loses its “independence” from society. 
It succumbs to the “attacks of pressure groups…monopolies and…unionised 
workers”.10 Instead of governing over them, they govern through the state, and in 
this way tend to transform the state into a “self-serving unlimited-liability insurance 
company, in the business of insuring all social interests at all time against every 
conceivable risk”, from the cradle to the grave.11 The weak state is unable to set 
limits to the contesting social forces and thus fails to depoliticise the socio-economic 
relations on the basis of a rule-based system of market interaction. Ultimately, the 
weak state is unable to distinguish itself from society, leading to the potentially 
ruinous politicisation and collapse of a free market society. Instead of governing 
over society to maintain and achieve the further progress of what Adam Smith called 
the system of perfect liberty, the state is “being pulled apart by greedy self-seekers. 
Each of them takes out a piece of the state’s power for himself and exploits it for 
its own purposes…This phenomenon can best be described by a term used by Carl 
Schmitt –‘pluralism’. Indeed, it represents a pluralism of the worst possible kind. 
The motto for this mentality seems to be the ‘role of the state as a suitable prey’”.12 
vol. 53, no. 1 (2010), pp. 129–151.
 9  For a discussion on the innate connection between the force of law and the rule of law, see Walter Benjamin, 
‘Critique of Violence’, in Reflections, edited by Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1986) and Carl 
Schmitt, Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). The difference between 
Benjamin’s and Schmitt’s conception of the relationship between law and violence stems from their divergent 
approach to the existing social relations, the one critical in his conception of reality, the other analytical 
in his defence of the existent political reality. Schmitt’s was a regular point of reference for the emergent 
ordoliberal account of political economy in the late 1920s/early 1930s. See Haselbach, op. cit.; Renato Cristi, 
Authoritarian Liberalism (Cardiff: Wales University Press, 1998), and Lutz A. Bentin, Johannes Popitz und 
Carl Schmitt (München: Beck, 1972).
10  Alexander Rüstow, ‘General Social Laws of the Economic Disintegration and Possibilities of Reconstruction’, 
Afterword to Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: Hodge, 1942), p. 276.
11  The argument about the state as an insurance company quotes from King’s diagnosis of the 1970’s crisis of the 
(British) state as a crisis of ungovernability. Anthony King, ‘The Problem of Overload’, in Anthony King (ed.), 
Why is Britain Harder to Govern (London: BBC Books, 1976), p. 12.
12  Alexander Rüstow, ‘Die staatspolitischen Voraussetzungen des wirtschaftspolitischen Liberalismus’, in 
Alexander Rüstow, Rede und Antwort (Ludwigsburg: Hoch, 1932/1963), p. 255. Translation from German into 
English by author.
European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/20154
For the sake of liberty, what is therefore needed is a state that “governs, that is, a 
strong state, a state standing where it belonged, above the economy and above the 
interest groups”.13 Only a strong state can distinguish itself from society. It prevents 
government from becoming the ‘prey’ of the many contradictory rent-seeking social 
interests. Instead, by establishing itself as the independent power over society, it 
governs for the sake of a liberal economic constitution and the associated rules of 
social conduct, laws of economic engagement, and generalised forms of civility. The 
idea of a free economy entails that production and distribution are regulated through 
competitive exchanges, mediated by money. This regulation is achieved where there 
is ‘perfect liberty’; where, in other words, a free economy is not impeded by the 
assertion of private economic power and powerful social forces. The free economy 
does not create the conditions of liberty upon which it feasts with often destructive 
consequences. In the ordoliberal account, its constitution and maintenance is a matter 
of government. The strong state governs for a free economy whereas the weak state 
succumbs to competing social forces and is devoured by them, leading, they say, to 
economic chaos. 
 For the ordoliberals, liberalism has always to focus on the “whole”, and this 
whole “is the state”.14 For the sake of a free economy, the distinction between 
society and state is not negotiable. On the threat of ‘ungovernability’, the liberal 
rule of law can therefore not be subjected to shifting democratic parliamentary 
majorities. Society is either governed by the liberal rule of law or it is governed 
by the democratic principle of majority rule.15 If indeed there has to be democracy, 
it must therefore be “hedged in by such limitations and safeguards as will prevent 
liberalism being devoured by democracy. Mass man fights against liberal-democracy 
in order to replace it by illiberal democracy”, which is unlimited in its response 
to the competing social forces and contesting class interests, leading to the 
politicisation of the economy, if unchecked.16 The ordoliberal state does not allow 
itself to become “the target of special-interests rent seeking” be it as a consequence 
of the unlimited character of democracy or political assertion of interests groups.17 
Rather, it establishes itself as the independent power of depoliticised socio-economic 
relations. The strong state therefore does not contradict the idea of a free economy. 
Rather, it is the political power of a free economy in which economic activity takes 
the form of voluntary exchanges between formally free and equal economic agents, 
each seeking to maximise their utility whatever their specific purposes might be – 
profit, rent, or wage-based access to the means of subsistence.
Ordoliberalism therefore does not define the state in relationship to the economic 
nor is the economic defined in relationship to the state, a view which implies a 
conception of market and state as two distinct modes of social organisation. The 
perennial question about such a conception is whether the market has autonomy 
13 Ibid., p. 258.
14 Wilhelm Röpke, International Order and Economic Integration (Dodrecht: Reidel, 1959), p. 45.
15  Friedrich Hayek explores this distinction with unrelenting passion, particularly in his The Road to Serfdom 
(London: Routledge, 1944). Hayek was a post-war addition to the ordoliberal Freiburg School. His Road to 
Serfdom is in parts a fine résumé of ordoliberal ideas. Herman Finer’s riposte to Hayek, The Road to Reaction 
(London: Little, Brown, 1945), is not only insightful in its judgment. It has also been long forgotten. For 
Hayek, democracy has to be tied to liberal state purposes to secure the constitution of liberty in the action of 
economic agents. 
16 Wilhelm Röpke, Against the Tide (Vienna: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1969), p. 97.
17 Vanberg, op. cit., p. 7.
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vis-à-vis the state, or the state vis-à-vis the market, leading to arguments about the 
‘retreat’ or the ‘return’ of the state as actor.18 Rather, ordoliberalism conceives of the 
state as the concentrated force of a society, which in its concept contains both “greedy 
self-seekers” (Rüstow) and a “tendency towards proletarianisation” (Röpke).19 In the 
first case, if unfettered by the restraining power of the state, the society of “greedy 
self-seekers” is said to destroy the “ethical and social forces of coherence” of a 
free economy.20 In the second case, the class tied to work “might systematically do 
poorly”, and might therefore struggle for higher wages and full-employment at the 
expense of a free economy.21 They dismiss the redistribution of wealth as violating 
the principle of a free economy and reject a policy of full-employment as contrary 
to its logic. Rather than solving the problem presented by quarrelsome workers, it 
would stall economic development, creating unemployment. The struggle between 
the traders in labour power, the one buying the other selling, is innate to the concept 
of a free labour economy. In the words of Adam Smith, “wages depend upon contract 
between two parties whose interests are not the same”. That is, the “workmen desire 
to get a lot, the master to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine 
to raise, the latter to lower the wages of labour”.22 Within this zone of conflict, 
ordoliberalism declares for the strong state as “the guardian of enterprise”.23 The 
moral basis of this argument is ‘humanity’, understood abstractly as ‘competition’. 
Without competition, “man [is] not a human being”.24 Nevertheless, competition 
does “neither improve the morals of individuals nor assist social integration” and, if 
unrestrained, society will descend into “bloodshed and disorder”.25 The ordoliberal 
theme of the strong state entails therefore more than just “policing the market order” 
by means of a “central authority strong enough to maintain formal exchange equality 
between all economic agents”.26 It also means, and fundamentally so, the policing 
of the social order and establishment of a moral order that secures the “psycho-
moral forces” at the disposal of a capitalist society.27 For the sake of ‘humanity’, 
society needs to be ordered so that its freedom is not misused, as prices can be fixed, 
18  On the alleged retreat of the state in so-called neoliberal globalisation see, for example, Susan Strange, The 
Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On the apparent return of the state in 
the context of the crisis of 2007 see, Altvater, op. cit. For a critique see, Werner Bonefeld, ‘Free Economy 
and Strong State’, Capital & Class, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2010)., pp. 15–24; and Werner Bonefeld, ‘Global Capital, 
National State, and the International’, Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2008), pp. 63–72.
19  Rüstow, op. cit., p. 255; Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009), p. 218.
20 Rüstow, op. cit., p. 255.
21  Victor Vanberg, ‘”Ordnungstheorie” as Constitutional Economics. The German Conception of a “Social 
Market Economy”’, Ordo, Vol. 39 (1988), p. 26.
22  Smith, Wealth of Nations…, op. cit., p. 83. On the connection between Smith’s classical political economy and 
ordoliberal thought see, Werner Bonefeld, ‘Adam Smith and Ordoliberalism’, Review of International Studies, 
vol. 39, no. 2 (2013), pp. 233–250.
23 Victor Vanberg, The Constitution of Markets (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 50.
24  Walter Eucken, ‘What kind of Economic and Social System?’ in Alan Peackock and Hans Willgerodt (eds.), 
German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 34.
25  Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Trust, 1976), p. 340. Wilhelm Röpke, 
‘The Guiding Principles of the Liberal Programme’, in Hans F. Wünsche (ed.), Standard Texts on the Social 
Market Economy (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1982), p. 188.
26  Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State (London: Palgrave, 1988), p. 37. Emphasis added by 
author. 
27  Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: Hodge, 1942), p. 68. Müller-Armack speaks 
in this context of the need to incorporate competitiveness ‘into a total life-style’. Alfred Müller-Armack, ‘The 
Social Market Economy as an Economic and Social Order’, Review of Social Economy, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1978), 
p. 328.
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markets carved up, competitive adjustment avoided by means of protectionism and 
manipulation of monetary policy, and money can beget more money by mortgaging 
future profits, and workers can strike, the masses can revolt, and a proletarianised 
society can force the state to concede welfare. Just as Hobbesian man requires the 
Leviathan to sustain her fundamental sociability, competitive humanity requires a 
strong state authority to assure its orderly conduct. 
I have thus far presented the ordoliberal argument that in a free labour economy 
the pursuit of liberty presumes government to “prevent coercion of one individual 
by another”, enforce contracts that have been “voluntary entered into”, define “the 
meaning of property rights”, and interpret and enforce these “rights”. In addition, 
ordoliberalism argues that a free labour economy presumes the state to be an 
independent power of society that “promotes competition” in the face of quarrelsome 
workers and reluctant captains of industry who might be inclined to secure their 
interests by, say, monopoly pricing or other means of protection from the “heavy 
artillery of world market price”, avoiding competitive adjustment by improving the 
“cheapness of provision” by means of higher labour productivity. The economic 
activity in the form of voluntary exchanges presumes also that the state provides 
for the market what the market “cannot do for itself”. The state, then, is “essential 
both as a forum for determining the ‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret 
and enforce the rules decided upon”, and enforcement is necessary “on the part of 
those few who would otherwise not play the game”.28 That is, the political state does 
not compete with the invisible hand of the market. Rather, it depoliticises the social 
relations to achieve a law governed exchange society and in this manner it facilitates 
the operation of the invisible hand, which depends for its magic on unimpeded, 
entirely non-coerced and non-contested socio-economic relations, comprising social 
individuals as self-responsible entrepreneurs who more than just complying with the 
rules of the game do so willingly on the basis of their own initiative.
Laissez-faire is a category of economic order, one in which the economic agents 
compete with others on the basis of rule-governed exchange relations. It is therefore 
not a political category that applies to the character of the state and the conduct of 
public policy. Indeed, laissez-faire is not only “a highly ambiguous and misleading 
description of the principles on which a liberal policy is based”.29 It is also a dangerous 
idea if it is allowed to organise society as a whole. Competition is “not a principle on 
which the whole society can be built. From the sociological and moral point of view, 
it is even dangerous because it tends more to dissolve than to unite. If competition is 
not to have the effect of a social explosive and is at the same time not to degenerate, 
its premise will be a correspondingly sound political and moral framework”.30 For 
28  With the exception of the ‘heavy artillery of world market price’ and ‘cheapness of provision’, all quotations 
are from Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 27, 34, 
15, 25. Friedman’s liberalism commits to the ordoliberal principle of a rule-based system of economic freedom. 
For the sake of that freedom, he supported and advised the Pinochet dictatorship, which in the words of Hayek 
was ‘genuinely anxious to restore’ free economy. Hayek, quoted in Cristi, op. cit., p. 168. The reference to 
‘heavy artillery…’ is Marx’s, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 7. The phrase ‘cheapness of provision’ was coined by Adam Smith. In his view, the 
necessity of its achievement ‘produces what we call police’. Adam Smith, Lectures of Jurisprudence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 5, 6. On the meaning of a free labour economy see, Werner Bonefeld, 
‘Primitive Accumulation and Capitalist Accumulation’, Science and Society, Vol. 75, No. 3 (2011), pp. 379–
399.
29 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, op. cit., p. 84.
30 Röpke, The Social Crisis…, op. cit., p. 181.
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the sake of laissez faire as the principle of economic freedom, it can therefore not be 
a principle of political organisation and policy-making. Laissez faire is no “answer 
to riots”.31 It is neither an answer “to the hungry hordes of vested interests”32 nor to 
an unlimited mass democracy that does not know how to limit itself to the pursuit of 
a free economy.33 The viability of a free labour economy is a political matter. That is, 
and as Martin Wolf argued in a different context, a free economy cannot be built on 
“pious aspirations”. It rests on “organized coercive force”.34 
Liberalism does therefore not demand “weakness from the state, but only 
freedom for economic development under state protection”, to prevent “coercion 
and violence”.35 What is protected by the state is not independent of the state. On 
the contrary, its independence is an eminently political practice of government 
that is charged with achieving the “complete eradication of all orderlinessness 
[Ordnungslosigkeit] from markets and the elimination of private power from the 
economy”.36 The economic order of freedom is a depoliticised order, that is, it is 
a state-less sphere under state protection. Paraphrasing Franz Böhm, the state-less 
sphere of the free economy amounts to a political practice of ‘eradicating disorder’ 
from the economy. Order is a political category of economic constitution. The state 
therefore really is “the mistress of the economy in its totality as in its parts…and 
the state must master the whole of economic development both intellectually and 
materially”.37 The political state of free economy does not therefore tolerate private 
political power, which impedes the operation of the free price mechanism and thus 
prevents the magic of the invisible hand from taking hold. Anticipating the concluding 
argument, economic crisis is a consequence of such disorder to the operation of the 
free price mechanism, for which the invisible hand cannot be blamed. Its efficacy of 
economic regulation was in disarray because of weak government. The state, then, 
must plan for liberty and competition. In Thomas Balogh’s succinct characterisation 
of ordoliberalism, it amounts to an attempt at planning “by the free mechanism”.38 
The meaning of the ordoliberal conception of the strong state lies in this construction 
of a ruled-based system of economic freedom. 
Ordoliberalism thus recognises the primacy of economic freedom as a political 
responsibility. The economic sphere and the political sphere need to be conceived 
together interdependently and have to operate interdependently to maintain the 
31  Hans Willgerod and Alan Peacock (1989), ‘German Liberalism and Economic Revival’, in Alan Peackock and 
Hans Willgerodt, op. cit., p. 6.
32 Röpke, op. cit., p. 181.
33 Hayek, cited in Cristi, op. cit., p. 168. 
34 Martin Wolf, ‘The need for a new imperialism’, Financial Times, 10 October 2001.
35 Friedrich Hayek, A Tiger by the Tail (London: London Institute of Economic Affairs, 1972), p. 66.
36  Franz Böhm, Ordnung der Wirtschaft (Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1937), p. 150. Translation from German into 
English by author.
37  Ibid., p. 10. In a later publication Böhm makes the same point when he argued that free economy required 
the ‘etatisation of society’ to secure the responsible pursuit of freedom on the part of the economic agents, 
preventing the illiberal misuse of freedom by social forces. Böhm contrasts ‘etatisation’ as a force of freedom 
with the ‘socialisation’ of the state by the preying social forces, which in the form of the Keynesian welfare 
state, institutionalises ‘special interest rent seeking’ (Vanberg) as the raison d’être of the weak state. Franz 
Böhm, Reden und Schriften (Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 1969), p. 171. Translation from German into English by 
author.
38  Thomas Balogh, An Experiment in ‘Planning’ by the ‘Free’ Price Mechanism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1950. 
Balogh was an important Keynesian economist and advisor to the British Labour Party during the 1950s and 
1960s. Cerny’s definition of the liberal state as a ‘competition state’ captures the meaning of this conception 
well. Phil Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics (London: Sage, 1990).
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system of liberty as a whole.39 There is thus need for coordinating the economic, 
social, moral and political spheres, to achieve and maintain systemic cohesion. 
The organisational centre of a free labour economy is the state; it is the power of 
interdependence and the force of liberal coherence. The economic constitution of 
liberty amounts therefore not only to “an eminently political decision” but, also, to 
a constant political practice of government.40 Its success appears in the form of a 
functioning market system in which the economic agents respond to price signals in 
the civilised and entirely self-responsible manner of the entrepreneur who adjusts his 
or her utility calculations to the signals of the free price mechanism. 
The price mechanism operates akin to a “calculating machine”. It informs 
consumers and producers alike of the degree of scarcity in the whole economy. As 
such a “scarcity gauge”, it sustains the “automatic”, that is, non-coerced coordination 
and balancing of the interests of millions and millions of people.41 Ostensibly each 
individual partakes in a continuous consumer plebiscite that manifests the veritable 
democracy of supply and demand. Nevertheless, this rule-based system of economic 
regulation does not enact itself by force of its own innate automaticity. It depends 
in its entirety on “the will of the participants” to follow the movement of prices and 
not “to rebel against that movement” as self-seeking profiteers or welfare seeking 
proletarians.42 For the ordoliberals, then, the strong state is the limited state. It secures 
“the possibility of spontaneous action” in the behaviour of the economic agents by 
limiting itself to “the organisation of the market” as the sphere of a state-less freedom, 
which, unimpeded by powerful socio-economic interests, is solely regulated by the 
preference calculations of the free price mechanism.43 Ordoliberal political economy 
proclaims thus for the establishment of an economic constitution in which the acting 
economic agents “come under a regime of imposed liberty”.44 That is, the viability of 
an economy that is governed by supply and demands derives from a practice of power 
that is ‘beyond supply and demand’.45 Indeed, the attainment of the moral sentiments 
of enterprise and the achievement of a free-market order are more important than 
GDP inasmuch as GDP neither breeds the moral sentiments nor provides for liberty 
for that that socio-economic order, upon which it feeds. Laissez-faire is a function 
of a well-ordered commonwealth and as such it amounts to a political practice of 
empowered liberty. For the ordoliberals, the strong state is the political form of the 
economic principle of laissez-faire. Eucken therefore argues for an interdependency 
of orders, that is, the logic of the strong liberal state is the interdependent condition 
and premise of the logic of the free market.46
39  Interdependency is Eucken’s term. Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, 7th edition (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebert, 2004).
40  Franz Böhm, ‘Die Kampfansage an Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik. Zu einem Aufstaz im Kyklos’, 
Ordo, vol. 24 (1973), p. 39. Böhm’s essay is a reply to a Hajo Riese’s ‘Ordnungsidee und Ordnungspolitik: 
Kritik einer wirtschaftspolitischen Konzeption, Kyklos vol. 25, no. 1 (1972). Riese is a prominent Keynesian 
thinker, specialising in Keynesian monetary policy. Translation from German into English by author.
41 Eucken, ‘What kind...’, op. cit., pp. 28, 29.
42 Böhm, Ordnung…, op. cit., p. 11.
43 Eucken, Ibid., pp. 34, 45 fn 1, 34.
44  Christoph Engel, ‘Imposed Liberty and its Limits’, in Talia Einhorn, ed., Spontaneous Order, Organization and 
the Law (The Hague: Asser Press, 2003), p. 431.
45  Wilhelm Röpke, A Human Economy, 3rd ed. (Wilmington Delaware: ISI Books, 1998). The German title of his 
book is Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage (Zürich: Rentsch, 1958), that is, Beyond Supply and Demand. The 
German title focuses the locus of market integration on its political form, the form of the state, whereas the 
English title, A Humane Economy, focuses the liberal objective of state intervention.
46  Michel Foucault, Biopower (London: Palgrave, 2008) disagrees. He views the logic of the state as a logic 
Werner Bonefeld: Crisis, Free Economy and Strong State: On Ordoliberalism 9
CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL 
INTERVENTION
The article started with the observation that its title contains two paradoxes, one of 
which I have set out above. The second paradox derives from the political character 
of the system of liberty. In the ordoliberal account, a free economy and a strong state 
constitute an interdependent relationship, in which the state is the concentrated force 
of the system of liberty. Since economy has no independent existence, there can thus 
not be an economic crisis. Crises are crises of political economy. That is, the state 
really is the “planner for competition”, and an economic crisis therefore manifests 
a failure of economic planning. The state seemingly failed in its role as “market 
police”.47 For the ordoliberals, competition is thus a limited concept – its efficacy does 
not manifest itself by force of its own logic. In fact, left to its own devices competition 
is not a creative force; it is entirely destructive of its socio-economic preconditions. 
Competition and therewith regulation by the invisible hand, is the indispensable 
instrument of freedom - in the economic sphere. Competition “appeals…solely 
to selfishness” and selfishness greases the machinery of a free economy, in which 
labour is neither enslaved nor coerced but free.48 However, it neither integrates 
society nor creates a system of rules that recognise property rights, nor does it define 
the common attitudes, beliefs, and values that render society civil, nor does it know 
how to restrain and limit itself to the pursuit of liberty. The natural tendency of 
competition is towards either cut-throat competition or monopoly. Its liberal efficacy 
is therefore a function of careful political planning to restrain its nature on the basis 
of enabling rules. The sociability of the unsocial character of competition depends 
thus on the provision of a “robust political-legal-ethical-institutional framework”, 
which on the pain of ruin cannot be subject to unpredictable democratic majorities.49 
The veracity of the free economy is thus premised on the capacity of government 
to secure the appropriate order of freedom. The issue is not whether the state should 
or should not intervene. Rather, the issue is the purpose and method, the objective 
and aim of state intervention. The ordoliberal state ‘intervenes’ not for specific social 
ends. It ‘intervenes’ into the “economic sphere” and the “non-economic spheres” 
to secure the economic, social and ethical conditions upon which “efficiency 
competition” rests.50 Free markets thus become ‘inefficient’ and crisis-ridden not 
because of some innate economic logic. Rather, an economic crisis expresses a failure 
of political intervention, which either failed to curb the concentration of economic 
power or restrain excess competition, or failed to prevent proletarianisation or 
against the market. In contrast to Foucault, the logic of the market and the logic of the state are not opposed to 
each other. They are interdependent, and their interaction determines the functionality of the entire system of a 
political economy based on free labour. See also Keith Tribe, ‘The Political Economy of Modernity: Foucault’s 
Collège de France Lectures of 1978 and 1979’, Economy and Society, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2009), pp. 679–698. 
47  On the state as ‘police’, see Adam Smith, Lectures…, op. cit., p. 5. On ‘market police’, see Rüstow, ‘General 
Social Laws…’ op. cit., p. 289. The definition of the state as a ‘planner for competition’ is Hayek’s. Hayek, 
Road…, op. cit., p. 31. 
48 Rüstow, ‘General Social Laws…’ op. cit., p. 272. 
49  Wilhelm Röpke, Mass und Mitte (Zürich: Rentsch, 1950), p. 143. Translation from German into English by 
author.
50  Alfred Müller-Armack, ‘Thirty Years of Social Market Economy’, in Josef Thesing (ed.), Economy and 
Development (Mainz: Hase und Köhler, 1979), p. 147. Röpke, International…, op. cit. . 68, speaks in this 
context about the responsibility of the state to secure the ‘psycho-moral’ forces of enterprise. 
European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/201510
“special interest rent-seeking”. “The problem”, says Eucken, “of economic power 
can never be solved by further concentration of power, in the form of cartels or 
monopolies”, including trades union monopoly power on labour markets. This form 
of private power prevents competition and destroys the freedom of enterprise. The 
solution to the problem of economic power can therefore not be found in “a policy 
of laissez-faire which permits misuse of the freedom of contract to destroy freedom”. 
Therefore, the “problem of economic power can only be solved by an intelligent 
co-ordination of all economic and legal policy…Any single measure of economic 
policy should, if it is to be successful, be regarded as part of a policy designed and to 
establish and maintain economic order as a whole”.51 Economic experts, rather than 
democratic parliamentary majorities, are therefore said to be best placed to safeguard 
efficiency competition either by advising government on the conduct of policy or, 
one might add, by assuming direct responsibility for the making of economic policy, 
especially monetary policy by an independent central bank.52 
Since efficacy of free economy depends on a policy of laissez-faire, one should 
therefore “not speak of a ‘crisis of capitalism’ but of a ‘crisis of interventionism’”.53 
Government turned a blind eye to the problems of economy, society, morality, 
and democracy. It failed either in removing impediments to market freedom or in 
restraining the passions of competition or greed, or it failed in securing the ‘cheapness 
of provision’ by means of increased labour productivity, or it failed in embedding the 
spirit of enterprise into society at large, or it compounded a poverty of aspirations by 
a permissive welfare state, or it turned a blind eye to the rapacity of the poor, or it 
failed in the provision of sound monetary conditions, or it failed in the enforcement 
of antitrust and anti-monopoly legislation, etc.54 The ‘failure’ of the state is a failure 
of the independent power of a free economy. Government is not supposed to yield 
to demands that seek ‘freedom from want’ or ‘value for nothing’. It is not meant 
to turn a blind eye to the assertion of private power in the form of monopolies or 
cartels, nor is it meant to let itself be bullied by the private interests that seek either 
protection from market pressures or unrestrained market opportunities, nor is it 
meant to abandon liberal principles of economic constitution to mass democratic 
demands and aspiration, and trade union power. 
The notion that economic crises are in fact crises of political intervention 
elucidates the liberal paradox that the state always governs too much and too little, 
regulates too much and too little, restrains competition too much and too little. The 
market liberal idea that uninhibited market forces are the only remedy to resolving 
51 Walter Eucken, This Unsuccessful Age (London: Hodge, 1951), pp. 37, 36, 54. 
52  That is, ‘economic constitution must be understood as a general political decision as to how the economic 
life of the nations is to be structured’, and ‘[m]en of science by virtue of their profession and position being 
independent of economic interests, are the only objective, independent advisers capable of providing true 
insight into the intricate interrelations of economic activity and therefore also providing the basis upon which 
economic judgements can be made’. Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken, and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, ‘The Ordo 
Manifesto of 1936’, in Peacock and Willgerodt, op. cit., pp. 24, 15. On central bank independence, see Werner 
Bonefeld and Peter Burnham, ‘The politics of counter-inflationary credibility in Britain, 1990–1994’, Review 
of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1998), pp. 30–52. Euken, Grundsätze …, op. cit., provides an 
exhaustive discussion of economic policy instruments, from antitrust regulation to contract law, and rules of 
liability etc. Werner Bonefeld, ‘Human economy and social policy’, History of Human Sciences, vol. 26, no. 2 
(2013), pp. 106-125, explores the social policy instruments.
53 Wilhelm Röpke, Crisis and Cycles (London: Hodge, 1936), p. 160.
54  For a more detailed exposition, see Werner Bonefeld, Critical Theory and the Critique of Political Economy 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014), chaps. 7 and 8. In the context of the crisis of 2008, see also Greig Charnock, 
Thomas Purcell, and Ramon Ribera-Fuma, The Limits to Capital in Spain (London: Palgrave, 2014). 
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economic crisis is thus deceitful. Uninhibited markets describe a political practice 
of eliminating impediments to free economy. Similarly, the idea that market failure 
is a consequence of too little or too much regulation is deceitful in that it identifies 
the cause of crises in the adopted means of political regulation, as if a free labour 
economy is susceptible to crisis only when the state falls short in its role as market 
police. A free economy is not a system of political engineering. Nevertheless, in 
either case, the state is endorsed as the indispensable power and crucial force of a 
free labour economy.
I have argued that ordoliberalism amounts to a statement about the political 
character of a free labour economy. For the sake of economic liberty, it recognises 
that the state cannot have enough power. The demand for the strong state is a demand 
for an effective market police. 
